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ABSTRACT
The application of time Petri net modelling and analysis techniques to safety-
critical real-time systems is explored and procedures described which allow
analysis of safety, recoverability, and fault tolerance. These procedures can be
used to help determine software requirements, to guide the use of fault detection
and recovery procedures, to determine conditions which require immediate miti
gating action to prevent accidents, etc. Thus it is possible to establish important
properties duing the synthesis of the system and software design instead of using
guesswork and costly a posteriori analysis.
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Introduction
Computers are increasingly being used as passive (monitoring) and active
(controlling) components of real-time systems, e.g. air traffic control, aerospace,
aircraft, industrial plants, and hospital patient monitoring systems. The prob
lems of safety become important when these applications include systems where
the consequences of failure are serious and may involve grave danger to human
life and property.
Although in a batch system it is reasonable to abort execution and attempt
to fix the problem when a failure occurs, control usually cannot be abandoned
abruptly in an embedded system. Therefore, responses to hardware failures,
software faults, human error, and undesired and perhaps unexpected environmen
tal conditions must be built into the system. These responses can take three
basic forms:
1) a fault-tolerant system continues to provide full performance and functional
capabilities in the presence of operational faults.
2) a fail-soft system continues operation but provides only degraded perfor
mance or reduced functional capabilities until the fault is removed.
3) a fail-safe system attempts to limit the amount /of damage caused by a
failure. No attempt is ma.de to satisfy the functional specifications except
where necessary to ensure safety.
These responses are, for most situations, in the order of decreasing desirability
although when the functional and safety requirements of the system are not
identical (and especially when they are conflicting), they are not necessarily of
^This work was partially supported by a MICRO grant co-funded by the University of
California and Hughes Aircraft Co.
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decreasing importance.
The area of system safety is well-established, and procedures exist to identify
and analyze electromechanical hazards along with techniques to eliminate or limit
hazards in the final product (for a summary, see Hammer (1972)). Unfortunately,
much more is known about how to engineer safe mechanical systems than safe
software systems. With the increased use of software in safety-critical com
ponents of complex systems, government certification agencies and contractors
are increasingly including requirements for software hazard analysis and
verification of software safety (e.g. see MIL-STD-882b: System Safety Program
Requirements). Modelling and analysis tools are desperately needed to aid in
these tasks. This paper explores the application of Petri net modelling and
analysis techniques to the design of safety-critical real-time systems. Because
timing is crucial with respect to the control of real-time systems. Time Petri nets
are used.
The next section describes the general approach to be taken. Following
that, procedures are outlined for eliminating hazards from the system design.
Then potential failures are added to the analysis procedures.
Safety Analysis
Whereas system reliability deals with the problems of ensuring that a sys
tem, including all hardware and software subsystems, performs a required task or
mission for a specified time in a specified environment, system safety is concerned
only with ensuring that a mishap does not occur in the process. Usually there are
many possible system failures which have relatively little "cost" associated with
them. Others have such drastic consequences that an attempt must be made to
avoid them at all costs, perhaps even at the cost of attaining some or all of the
goals of the system.^ For example, an amusement park ride may have to be tem
porarily stopped because conditions are such (e.g. a foreign object is on the
tracks) that a derailment is possible. Thus the response to a safety critical
failure may focus on reduction of risk rather than attainment of mbsion [Leveson
(1984)].
While software itself cannot be unsafe, it can issue commands to a system it
controls which place the system in an unsafe state. Furthermore, the controlling
software should be able to detect when factors beyond the control of the
^In a system whose sole purpose is the sustaining of life, e.g. a pacemaker, these conflicts
between safety and other system requirements do not occur.
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computer (e.g. environmental conditions) place the system in a hazardous state
and to take steps to elirninate the hazard or, if that is not possible, initiate pro
cedures to minimize the hazard. This then is the problem of software safety.
If software safety is to be studied and used as a measure of software quality,
then some definitions are necessary. A mishap is an event or series of events
which results in death, injury, illness, or damage to or loss of property or equip
ment. A hazard or unsafe state is a condition or state of the system with the
potential for (i.e. some non-zero probability of) leading to a mishap. Hazards can
be categorized by the aggregate probability of the occurrence of the individual
conditions which make up the hazard and by the seriousness of the resulting
mishap. Together these constitute risk.
The first step in an safety analysis is to identify the system hazards and
assess their severity and probability (i.e. risk). The next step is to design the sys
tem so as to eliminate hazards or (if that is not possible) to minimize the risk by
altering the design' so that there is very little probability of the hazard occurring.
This can be accomplished by first ensuring that the system as specified is safe, i.e.
given that the specifications are correctly implemented and no failures occur,
operation of the system will not result in a mishap. The next step in the design
process is to identify and eliminate (by using fault tolerance techniques) single
point failure modes which can lead to a hazard. Finally, techniques are used to
ensure that the probability of multiple sequences of failures leading to a hazard is
sufficiently low. If it is impossible to completely eliminate the possibility of a
hazard, a design goal may be to minimize the effects of the hazard should it
occur. In this case the system should detect the hazard and attempt to eliminate
it, if possible; otherwise an attempt should be made to minimize any possible
effects. In either case, in order to reduce risk, the exposure time (length of time
of occurrence) of the hazardous conditions must be minimized. The goal of the
techniques presented in this paper is to develop formal procedures to aid in this
safety analysis process.
It is important to stress the "system" nature of the problem. Software does
-not harm anyone ~ only the instruments which it controls can do damage.
Therefore, software safety procedures cannot be developed in a vacuum, but
must be considered as part of the overall system safety. For example, a particu
lar software error may cause a mishap only if there is a simultaneous human
and/or hardware failure. Alternatively, an environmental event or failure may be
involved in the software error. Mishaps are often the result of multiple failure
sequences which involve hardware, software, and human failures. One modelling
technique which has the potential for analyzing software for real-time systems
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within a system viewpoint is Time Petri nets.
Petri nets have been used to model and analyze systems for such properties
as deadlock and reachability. In this paper we show how they can be used in
designing and analyzing such properties as safety and fault-tolerance. Time Petri
nets were chosen over other modeling techniques for the following reasons:
• They can be used early in the development cycle (vs. verification and valida
tion methods) so that changes can be made while they are still relatively
inexpensive. In practice, very safe systems, once built and tested, are some
times found to be unacceptable in terms of performance and/or reliability.
The design must then be modified. It would be much less costly to deter
mine these tradeoffs using a modeling technique before the system is actually
built and to adjust the design accordingly. Performance analysis using time
Petri nets has been explored by Ramamoorthy and Ho (1980), Razouk
(1983), and Zuberek (1980).
• A systems approach is possible with Petri nets since hardware [e.g. Azema
et.al (1976), Hack (1972)], software [e.g. Nelson et.al (1983), Peterson (1981),
Rose (1984)1, and human behavior can be modelled using the same language.
By combining hardware, software, and human components within one model,
it is possible to determine, for example, the effects of a failure or fault in one
component on another component. It is also possible to use the model to
determine software safety and fault tolerance requirements. Writing correct
software requirements is a difficult problem for which there are few analyti
cal tools available. The possibility of using Petri nets for this problem is
intriguing. Techniques such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
and Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) [Hammer (1972)] have been
developed to determine the system safety requirements. However, there is a
need to be able to go from the system safety requirements to the software
safety requirements. Fault tree analysis has been used for the task [Leveson
and Harvey (1983)], but has some drawbacks. Using the hazardous states
which have been identified in the PHA, it may be possible to work backward
to the software interface using Petri net analysis techniques and thus to
derive the software safety requirements. As an example, Coolahan and
Roussopoulos (1983) have shown how Petri nets can be used to derive timing
requirements for modules in real-time systems where the service involves
repetitive performance of similar activities at a fixed, constant, and predeter
mined interval. A more general procedure which does not have these limita
tions can be found in Merlin (1974) and Merlin and Farber (1976). Petri net
models can also be used to determine the most critical software functions
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which can then be augmented with fault toleranceTTacilities-a'^ d to determine^
the conditions which must be incorporated into the run-time tests associated
with these facilities such as watchdog timers and acceptance tests in
recovery blocks.
• Petri nets can be used at various levels of abstraction [e.g. Azema et.al
(1975), Estrin (1978), Noe (1978)]. Thus an event at one level of abstraction
may be a series of events at a lower level of abstraction. The ability to
analyze the effects of failures at one level on higher levels of the system
would be useful.
• Petri nets provide a modelling language which can be used for both formal
analysis and simulation [Razouk (1981)]. Questions about the design which
cannot be answered through analysis techniques can often be answered
through simulation. Interactive simulators also provide the designer with
the opportunity to study potential design modifications. Finally, the non-
software components of the Petri net model can be used as a test harness for
software testing and debugging.
• Using Time Petri allows the incorporation of timing information into the
analysis. Many modelling and analysis techniques do not have this facility,
but it is imperative for real-time embedded systems. In these systems, for
example, basically correct software actions which are too early or too late
can lead to unsafe conditions. Any safety analysis which does not include
time will be incomplete.
It is important to note that Petri net models as used in this paper are pri
marily concerned with modeling control and control failures. Obviously, there are
important errors and failures which involve other than the control aspects of a
system, e.g. data and computation problems. These can be modeled by augment
ing the basic Petri net model with a data graph and interpretation as has been
done in Sara [Estrin (1978)] and Logos [Rose and Albarran (1975)]. This is an
important extension but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Now that the basic goals of software safety analysis have been described and
the reasons for choosing this particular technique outlined, the details of the pro
cedures can be presented.
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Formal Definitions
A Petri net is composed of a set of places P, a set of transitions T, an input
function I, an output function O, and an initial marking Pq. The input function I
is a mapping from the transition t- to a bag of places I(t.) where a bag is a gen
eralization of a set which allows multiple occurrences of an element. Similarly,
the output function O maps a transition tj to a bag of places O(t-). The initial
placement of tokens on the places of the net is specified by Pq. Formally, this is
written:
Definition: APetri net structure, is a five-tuple, $=(P,T,I,0,/Iq).
P={pj,P2,. -jPjj} is a finite set of places, n>0.
T={tj,t2,.- >tjj^} is a finite set of transitions, m>0. The set of places and
the set of transitions are disjoint, PnT= 0.
i:T —»-P^ is the input function, a mapping from transitions to bags of
places.
O: T—^P°° is the output function, a mapping from transitions to bags of
places.
Finally, Pq.P —» N is the initial marking for the net where N b the set of
non-negative integers.
Definition: The multiplicity of an input place pj for a transition tj is the
number of occurrences of the place in the input bag of the transition,
denoted #(pj,I(tj)). The multiplicity of an output place is defined similarly
and denoted #(Pj,0(tj)).
A graph structure is often used for illustration of Petri nets where a circle " O "
represents a place and a bar " | " represents a transition. Figure 1 shows a petri
net and the corresponding petri net graph. An arrow from a place to a transition
defines the place to be an input to the transition. Similarly, an output place is
indicated by an arrow from the transition to the place.
The dynamic aspects of Petri net models are denoted by markings which are
assignments of tokens to the places of a Petri net. Markings may change during
execution of a Petri net.
Definition: A marking p of a, Petri net $ is a function from the set of
places P to the nonnegative integers N, p: P—*N.
The execution of a Petri net is controlled by the number and distribution of
tokens in the Petri net.
Definition: A transition is enabled if and only if each of its input places
contains at least as many tokens as there exists arcs from that place to the
transition, i.e.
computer
Figure 1. A Petri Net Graph
P={Pi,P2'''3'^ 4'^ 5'^ 6'^ 7'^ 8'^ 9'^ 10'^ 10'^ ir^l2 ^
T = {tj,t2,t3,t^,tg,tg,ty }
A/q = (1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0)
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
1) = {Pi}
2) = {Pg}
3) = {P3}
4) = ^P5'P6>
5) = {P^-Pg}
q) - {PiO'^ 12^
7) ={Pg-Pii?
0(tj) = {P2,P5}
0(t2) = {Pg}
^(^3) —{^4'^ 8^
^(^4) —{^75^9}
0(15) = {^G'^ IO^
0(t6)={Pii}
0(17) = {^12}
Figure lb. Description of the Above Petri Net
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A^(Pi) > #(Pi>I(tj)) for all p. e P
When a transition fires, all enabling tokens are removed from its input places,
and a token is deposited in each of its output places. Given the Fetri net marking
in figure 1, the next state after firing transition tj is shown in figure 2. Transition
firings continue as long as there exists at least one enabled transition.
When using Fetri nets to model systems, places represent conditions and
transitions are used to represent events. Figure 1 can be interpreted as a model
of a simple railroad crossing. Fj, Fg, F^, and F^ represent the different condi
tions that can hold for the train (i.e. approaching, just before, within, and past
the crossing, respectively). Similarly, transitions 1, 2, and 3 denote the events of
signalling the train's approach, entering the crossing, and signalling the train's
departure. The large box represents the controlling device or computer —either
hardware or software based. The states of the gate are represented by two places
Fjj (the gate is up) and F^g (the gate is down). Transitions 6 and 7 represent
the events of raising and lowering the gate respectively.
The state of the Fetri net (and hence the state of the modeled system) is
defined by the marking (the existing conditions). The change in state caused by
firing a transition is defined by the next-state function 8.
Definition; The next-state function 8: X T —• for a Fetri net
4>=(P,T,I,0,/iQ) with marking n and transition tj GT is defined if and only
if t. is enabled.
If 8{n,t|) is defined, then 8{fi,t^) = ft' where
/ '^(Pi) = /^(Pi) - #(Pi. I(tj)) + #(Pp 0(tj)) for all p. GF
Definition: For a Fetri net $=(F,T,I,0,/Iq) with marking //, a marking /i'
is immediately reachable from /i if there exists a transition tj GT such that
%,tj)=/i'.
The "reachability" relationship is the reflexive transitive closure of the "immedi
ately reachable" relationship.
Definition: The reachability set R(^,//) for a Fetri net $=(F,T,I,0,/Iq)
with marking fi is the smallest set of markings defined by:
1. /I G R(^,/i)
2. If /i' GR(^,/^) and ft'' —tf(/i',tj), for some tj GT,
then /i'' 6 R(<I>,/i).
Approach ( Pj
Before
Crossing V 2
Within I P
Past I P
Train
Computer
Figure 2. A Petri Net Graph with the Next State Shown
Down
Railroad
Crossing
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Both trees and graphs have been used to represent the reachability state. In this
paper, a reachability graph is used where the nodes of the graph are labeled with
the present marking (i.e. the state) and the arcs represent transitions between
states (see figure 3).
Definition: A path P in the reachability graph is a sequence of transitions
t.,...,tj starting at marking to /ij such that
^"j
Definition: The extended next-state function 6* is defined for a marking /i,
and a sequence of transitions s 6 T by
6*{fi,t.s) = (5(5*(/i,tj),s)
6*{ti,\)= n
To model time requires enhancements to the basic Petri net model. There
have been several proposals for extending standard Petri nets to include time.
Ramchandani (1974) proposed associating delays with transitions. Merlin (1974)
proposed using two values, Min and Max times, to define a a range of delays for
each transition. This approach has also been used by Berthomieu and Menasche
(1983). Sifakis (1977) proposed instead associating the delays with places.
Coolahan and Roussopoulos (1983) employed an approach similar to Sifakis.
Associating delays with places does not increase the power of the model, but does
retain the instantaneous firing feature of the basic Petri net model. In fact, tran
sition delays and place delays are equivalent since one can be translated into the
other. Razouk (1983) has proposed using firing times along with enabling times.
In his model, the tokens are absorbed by the transition after the enabling time
has elapsed and do not reappear on the output places until after the transition
finishes firing (i.e. after the firing time has elapsed). This model is less flexible
than the Merlin and Farber model, but does make performance analysis easier.
Since our goal is not performance analysis using known times but the deriva
tion of timing constraints, we have chosen to use the Merlin and Farber model.
Tokens are allowed to remain on the input places during the transition delay so
the model retains the instantaneous firing feature of untimed Petri nets while also
providing a very flexible modeling tool.
A Time Petri net (TPN) is a Petri net, i.e. it is composed of a set of places
P, a set of transitions T, an input function I, and an initial marking /Iq along
Undesired
States
Desired
States
Figure 3. Reachability Graph for Figure 1
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with the added firing time functions Min and Max. The firing time functions
specify the conditions under which a transition may fire. Formally, this is writ
ten:
Definition: A Time Petri net structure, is a seven-tuple,
$=(P,T,I,0,Min,Max,//Q).
P={p.,P2,.,.,p^} is a finite set of places, n>0.
T={tj,t2,...,t^} is a finite set of transitions, m>0. The set of places and
the set of transitions are disjoint, PnT= 0.
^ oo
I:T —*P is the input function, a mapping from transitions to bags of
places.
O: T—»^P°° b the output function, a mapping from transitions to bags of
places.
Min and Max are the min time function and max time function, respectively,
where
Min:T —*• R and Max:T —> R, R b the set of non-negative real numbers
and
Minj < Max- for all i such that tj GT.
Finally, fiQ.P —N is the initial marking for the net where N is the set of
non-negative integers.
Definition: A transition is firable at time r if and only if it has been con
tinuously enabled during the interval r - Min(t.) to r. The firable transition
may fire at any time t for Min(t.) < r < Max ft-). Atransition must fire at
time Tif it has been continuously enabled during the interval r-Max(tj) to
r.
Definition: The state of the net (t consists of the tuple (/i,E) where p is the
marking and E is the remaining enabling time vector. E is a function of a
set of tuples of real numbers R, E: (R X R) —(R X R)
An excellent description of the next-state function for Time Petri nets can be
found in Berthomieu and Menasche (1983). Added complexity over the untimed
Petri net arises because of the continuous nature of time. Since transitions may
fire at any time in their allowed interval, the states have in general an
unbounded number of successors. Berthomieu and Menasche solve this problem
by defining state classes which consider the set of all states reachable from the
initial state by a given sequence of transitions.
Note that the Time Petri net is equivalent to a standard Petri net if all Min
times are 0 and all Max times are set to oo. Abo note that the markings of the
states of the Time Petri net reachability graph will be equal to or a subset of the
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markings of the equivalent untimed Petri net. This is true since the enabling
rules for the time Petri net are the same as for a Petri net. The difference lies in
the additional restrictions placed on the firing rules. Thus adding timing may
restrict the set of possible markings, but will never increase it. Since we are basi
cally interested in determining worst cases (including the potential effects of hav
ing timing failures), much of our analysis will involve deriving the untimed
reachability graph and then determining 1) the timing constraints of the final sys
tem necessary to avoid high-risk states, and 2) the run-time checks, e.g. watchdog
timers, needed to be used to detect critical timing failures.
Eliminating High-Risk States from the Design
A mishap is an unplanned event or series of events that results in death,
injury, illness, or damage to or loss of property or equipment. Mishaps can be
classified as to severity from catastrophic to negligible.
Definition: A hazard is a set of conditions within a state from which there
is a path to a mishap. A state <t is hazardous if and only if there exists a
9(c sfc
mishap state and a sequence of transitions s G T such that 6
Hazards can be classified according to the severity of any possible resulting
mishap. For simplicity we will divide hazards into two groups ~ high-risk and
low-risk ~ where high-risk hazards can lead to catastrophic (unacceptable) losses.
Of course more categories can and often are used. It is important to note that in
many, if not most, realistic systems it is impossible to completely eliminate risk.
The goal instead is to design asystem with "acceptable risk." ^
To show that a system is safe or low-risk, it is necessary to first ensure
that given that the specifications are correctly implemented, no mishaps will
result. Second, the risk of faults or failures leading to a mishap must be elim
inated or minimized. In this section we discuss how to identify and eliminate
high-risk hazards which have been designed into the system. The next section
^What is acceptable risk is often determined by appropriate government licensing agen
cies. For example, mishaps have been defined by the NRC for all nuclear systems. If
not predetermined by law, the definition and categorization of mishaps as to severity
must be done in the early stages of the system design.
''Because the term "safe" has a specific meaning in Petri net theory (a place is safe if it
never contains more than one token), we will use the term "low-risk" where necessary to
avoid confusion.
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will treat the problem of failures.
Creating the reachability graph allows the designer of a system to determine
if the system design can "reach" any high-risk states since it determines all possi
ble states that the system can reach from the initial state by any legal sequence
of transition firings. However, this may well be impractical due to the size of the
reachability graph for a complex system. In the rest of this section, we describe
techniques which may allow the design to be analyzed for safety without produc
ing the entire reachability graph.
The states of a reachability graph can be separated into two disjoint sets:
States from which it is possible to reach high-risk and possibly also low-risk
states and those from which it is possible to reach only low-risk stat«.
Definition: A state (marking) is a critical state if and only if
a) /i^ Glow-risk states and
b) there exist two sequences of transitions, s^ and Sg , a /i^ and a /Xj such
that S* Sj) = /Xj and 6*{fi^,S2) = /ij where /x- Ghigh-risk states and
G low-risk states.
If a high-risk state is reachable, then there must be a critical state on the path
from the initial state to the high-risk state (this includes the possibility that the
critical state is the initial state). Otherwise, the design needs to be completely
redone from scratch since all executions result in high-risk states.
To eliminate hazards, it is not necessary to produce the entire reachability
graph but only to determine the critical states and to disallow the unwanted
transition in each case. Some of our techniques are conservative, i.e. in order to
reduce the large amount of computing to produce the entire graph, a larger
number of critical states may be identified than actually exist. But note that it
does no harm to eliminate a hazard which never existed. Also, as will be seen in
the next section when failures are discussed, eliminating a non-existent path may
have the efiTect of eliminating or lessening the possibility of mishaps caused by
run-time failures and faults.
One way to locate critical states without necessarily producing the entire
reachability graph is to start with the set of high-risk states and to work back
ward to determine if they are reachable from the initial state. This approach is
useful when the goal of the analysis is only to prove that the system cannot reach
certain hazardous states. This is often a requirement for safety-critical systems,
e.g. see MIL-STD-882b. Fault tree analysis is a similar technique used for the
same purpose [Vesely et. al. (1981)]. The backward approach is itself practical
only if one considers a relatively small number of high-risk states. This has been
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found to be adequate in practice [Vesely et. al. (1981)]. Note that the concern
here is not with correctness, but with system safety. That is, a system is "safe"
if it is free from mishaps even if it also does not accomplish its "mission" or func
tional objectives.
To determine if a state can be reached using backward reachability graphs,
it is necessary to temporarily ignore timing constraints. The procedure is to first
construct the inverse untimed Petri net.
Definition; The inverse Petri net, $ ^ for a Petri net $=(P,T,I,0) is
defined by interchanging the input and output functions, $ (P,T,0,I).
A reachability graph is then constructed using the inverse Petri net and the
high-risk state as the initial marking. If the original initial state is reachable,
then the mishap may be possible.
Theorem: A high-risk state a is in the reachability set R($,<t«) if and
in u
only if given an initial state <Tq, (Tq GR(^
The proof can be shown by induction on the sequence of transition firings.
By definition if /i = 5(/i',t) then /<' = This allows the sequence of
transitions from <7q to to be traversed in reverse order.
Even though a high-risk state is reachable in the untimed Petri net, it may
not be reachable when time constraints are considered. Two approaches are possi
ble. The first is to use the time constraints and work forward from the initial
state to determine if the timing constraints have eliminated this path from the
timed reachability graph. The other is to assume the worst and just modify the
design to ensure that the path is eliminated.
This backward approach is only helpful if the resulting reachability graph is
smaller than the original. If the state is reachable, then the backward reachabil
ity graph can never be larger than the original reachability graph. Unfor
tunately, if the high-risk state is not reachable, it is possible for the backward
reachability graph to actually be larger than the original graph and even to be
infinite. Therefore, again it may be impractical to generate the entire backward
reachability graph.
But if the goal is to ensure that high-risk states can never be reached, it is
possible to simply work backward to the first "critical" state (in this case to a
state in the reachability graph which has two successors) and to use design tech
niques such as those outlined below to ensure that the bad path is never taken.
It is unimportant as to whether this path is actually reachable since eliminating
the possibility of a mishap which would not have occurred does no harm. It is
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also unimportant if this is truly a critical state as defined above (one path leads
to low-risk states) since if the uneliminated path also leads to a mishap, this will
be determined in a later step, and this second path will also be eliminated.
The following describes the details of the algorithm to identify and eliminate
critical states:
Put initial set of high-risk conditions into S = states_to_process
while S is not empty
do
let c be one of S;
if c is a subset of the initial state then
high-risk state reachable and need to redesign
else
do {work backwards to critical states}
{determine which transitions are enabled}
for each transition t G T
do
let R = 0(t) n c;
TE = 0(t) - R;
SE = c-R;
if R ^ 0 then (t is enabled and we need to
(generate the corresponding next backward states}
Next_back_states = Next_back_states U '^^ (R UTE USE,t);
od
for each next_back_state b
do
Forward_states = set of states #(b,t)
Other_states <~ Forward_states - [Forward_states D (S U Next_back_states}]
case b
b G states_considered : exit;
b is illegal according to system invariants : exit;
b is high risk : add b to S;
b is low-risk and there exists a f G other_states such
that f is low-risk (therefore b is potentially critical}: add b to set of critical states;
else (b is low-risk but not critical - necessary to go
backwards again}
add b to S;
esac
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od
move C from S to states_considered;
augment design by eliminating bad transitions from critical states;
od
end 'while
The above algorithm starts •with the set of high-risk conditions. For each
member of this set, the immediately prior state or states are generated. Each of
these "one-step-backward" states is then examined to see it if is a potentially
critical state and can be used to eliminate one path to the high-risk state; Note
that we are not dealing with complete states but only with partial states. That
is, some conditions in the state are unimportant as far as risk goes. Furthermore,
we do not know what the complete final states are. Therefore there may be some
"don't care" places in each state which are determined in the process of execut
ing the algorithm. Finally, we only need to look forward one step from each
potentially critical state in order to label it as critical (i.e. there exists a next-
state which is low-risk). This is because if this path also leads to a high-risk
state, then it will be eliminated by the algorithm in a later step.
Using the train example again, figure 3b shows the partial graph generated
by the algorithm for the high risk state where the train is approaching (P^), the
gate is up (Pjj), and any other "don't care conditions" (denoted by the "*")
may also hold. Propagating this state backwards, we reach the initial state,
impossible states, and critical states. From this we derive the information that in
order to avoid the high-risk state, the design must be modified to ensure that
transition t^ has priority over transition tj^^ and that transition tg has priority
over transition t^.
When a critical state is identified, it is necessary to modify the Petri net in
some way to ensure that the good path is always taken, i.e. that another transi
tion always is performed before or has priority over the critical transition.^
There are many possible ways of modifying the system design to eliminate
the high-risk states. One common approach is to use an interlock. Interlocks are
used to ensure correct sequences of events. An example of a hardware interlock
is an access panel or door .to equipment where a high voltage exists. Software
^By requiring that a transition t- always has priority over a transition t. in all situations
may be more strict than absolute^ necessary but this is true of most safety devices and is
one reason why safety occasionally conflicts with other ^stem qualities such as perfor
mance.
critical state
impossible
impossible
P P P ♦
high-risk
state
critical state
Figure 3b. Example of Critical State Algorithm
subset of
initial
state
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interlocks include monitors and batons. To model an interlock in a Petri net,
assume that t- is the desired transition, while tj is the undesired transition. It is
possible to force the system always to take the desired path (i.e. to eliminate the
undesired path from the reachability graph) by making the following changes to
the two transitions in the Petri net. Add a new place (the interlock I) to the out
put bag of t. and to the input bag of tj. This ensures that transition tj always
has priority over transition tj. There may be multiple desired transitions and an
interlock must be applied to each. See figure 4a for an example.
The above type of interlock is used to ensure that one event always precedes
another event (e.g. a baton in software). Another type involves ensuring that an
event does not occur while a condition is true. This is implemented in the Petri
net by using a locking place (see figure 4b). This corresponds to a critical section
in software.
In the train example, an interlock can be added between t^ and tg (see
figures 4c and 4d) in order to eliminate the high-risk states. The interlock is
included within the computer-controller, but alternatively it might have been
part of the hardware. One physical implementation of such an interlock might
be a computer-controlled warning signal for the train.
Another way to ensure that one transition will always fire when both are
enabled is to enforce timing constraints or timing conditions in the designed sys
tem. In order to ensure that a transition tj (which leads to the high-risk state)
does not fires whenever tj and tj are both enabled (i.e. the high-risk state is elim
inated from the reachability graph), the following timing constraint must be
enforced: the maximum time that it may take for the higher priority transition
(t.) to fire must be less than the minimum time for the lower priority transition
(t ) to become enabled and to fire. Each of these time quantities must be the
total time that the enabling conditions have been met, not just the individual
transition time limit.
One method of determining these quantities is to use the reachability graph
to find the maximum (minimum) valued path leading to the transition which has
the required conditions continually enabled. In the system modeled in figures 1
and 3, the desired goal is to have condition ^12 occur before condition P^. In
terms of the reachability graph this means that when in state P2^5^6^11
^2^7^9^ir ^2 firable. In the first case, the constraint
necessary for t^ to fire before tg is simply that Min(t2) > Max(t^). For the
second case it is a bit more complicated since firing tj results in tg being enabled.
The constraint in this case is Min(t2) > Max(ty)-|-Max(t^).
o
Figure 4a. Interlock
O
Figure 4b. Locking Place
computer
Figure 4c. A Petri Net Graph with an Interlock
P2P5P6P11 P4P7P8P1;
Figure 4d. New Reachability Graph
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Timing constraints are enforced in systems by either verifying that the
design makes it impossible for the constraint to be violated or by using watchdog
timers and other devices to determine when the constraint is about to fail and to
insert recovery techniques into the system design (either software or hardware).
An example is shown in the next section.
Adding Failures to the Analysis
Once the design is determined to have an acceptable level of risk, run-time
faults and failures must be considered. Designing for fault tolerance and safety
requires being able to model failures and faults and to analyze the resulting
model. In order not to cause confusion by providing our own definitions of terms
like "failure," we have tried to use standard definitions. However, there appears
to be some disagreement, so in this paper we take definitions from Kopetz (1982),
Laprie (1982), and Anderson and Lee (1982). A failure is defined as an event
while a fault is a state. A failure always results in a fault and is called a fault-
starting event. The fault remains in the system until the occurrence of a ter
minating event for this fault. In the time domain, failures can be characterized
by their frequency of occurrence within a given time interval as either singular
(once), intermittent (sometimes), or persistent (always). Laprie (1982) further
separates failures into benign and catastrophic.
In this paper, we are concerned with control failures. Control failures
include:
a required event that does not occur
an undesired event
an incorrect sequence of required events
two incompatible events occurring simultaneously
timing failures in event sequences
• exceeding maximum time constraints between events
• failing to ensure minimum time constraints between events
• durational failures (i.e. a condition or set of conditions fail to hold for a
particular amount of time)
Each of these types of failures must be able to be modeled in the Petri net.
Merlin and Farber (1976) modeled failures in Petri nets as a loss of token or gen
eration of a spurious token. Azema and Diaz (1977) took a similar approach.
This was appropriate since Merlin's goal was to analyze failures in communica
tion systems where the primary type of fault is the loss of a message due to
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failure of the underlying communication medium. However, when dealing with
analysis of failures in more general situations, it is often useful to be able to
determine the state that a system is in after the failure has occurred (i.e. the
fault). For example, if a token is lost when the system is in a state where a par
ticular bit is 1, it is important to know whether the failure results in a "stuck at
1" state or a "zero" state for the bit. This is because a fault remains in the sys
tem until a terminating event for the fault (the faulty condition is no longer true
or loses its token). Because of the faulty state or condition, it is possible for
further failures to occur [Kopetz (1982)] which cause further faults. Thus the
type of fault which results from the failure must be included in the model in
order to analyze the consequences of failures on the system (and thus to
differentiate between high and low cost failures). For analysis and readability
purposes, it is also useful to model failure events in a different way than normal,
expected events.
For these reasons, we introduce a new type of transition, a failure transition
which acts like other transitions but is denoted by a dotted bar and a fault condi
tion which is denoted by a dotted circle.^ For a Petri net, the set of transi
tions becomes T = Tj^ UTp where Tp are legal transitions and Tp are failure
transitions and Tp fl Tp = 0. Similarly, the set of places is now P = Pp UPp
where Pp are legal places and Pp are faults and Pp fl Pp = 0- Examples of
modeling some of the above types of control failures can be found in figure 5. The
failure transitions shown are infinitely fire-able. To make analysis practical, a
place which acts as a counter can be added to the failure transition. The number
of tokens initially contained in this place controls the maximum number of times
the transition (failure) can fire. Realistically, most systems are designed for a
maximum number of failures and the tokens in the counter are the Petri net
equivalent of this ceiling value.
We now have two types of states: faulty states and legal states.
Definition: A state a is a legal state if and only if there exists a path in the
failure reachability graph from the initial state <Tq to a which contains only
legal transitions, i.e. if is the initial state, and there exists a sequence of
legal transitions s GTp such that 6 (o"q,s) = a.
^Merlin actually includes failure transitions in his reachability graph (which he calls the
error token machine), but does not put them in the Petri net itself.
oo
Figure 5a. Desired Event tj Does Not Occur
O
6
Figure 5b. Undesired Event tj Occurs
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Definition: A state a is a faulty state if and only if every path P to c from
the initial state iTq contains a failure transition i.e. for every sequence s 6
T* where 5*(<Tq,s) = a there exists atj such that tj GTp and tjGs
Once failures are included in the model, it is necessary to decide what quali
ties of the design are important to analyze with respect to control failures. Three
such qualities are control fault tolerance, recoverability, and fail-safety. Control
fault tolerance implies that a system continues to function correctly (i.e. to pro
vide the service required by its specification) in the presence of component
failure. Recoverability implies that a system continues to provide service
although the service may be (temporarily) degraded (i.e. may not satisfy all the
requirements of the specification). A system is fail-safe if component faults do
not lead to a catastrophic system failure (mishap) although the system may not
provide any service except that required to prevent the catastrophic failure.
Each of these qualities can be defined in terms of Petri nets as follows:
Definition: A process P is recoverable if after the occurrence of a failure,
the control of the process is not lost, and in an acceptable amount of time, it
will return to normal execution. Formally, a process P is recoverable from a
failure t^ GTp if and only if in the failure reachability graph (FRG):
Let Ep be the set of faulty states and let be the set of legal states
1) the number of faulty states is finite,
cardma/i7j/(Ep)< oo
2) there are no terminal faulty states,
for all (7 GSp, is firable
3) there are no directed loops including only faulty states,
there does not exist a sequence tj ... t^^ in the FRG such that for <Tj G
Ep,
6(crj,tj) = for i=l..n-l and
4) the sum of the maximum times on all paths from the failure transition to
a correct state is less than a pre-defined acceptable amount of time.
For every path P (tj,...,t^) from GHp to G
EMaA(t.) < T^^eeptable j = l '"
This definition is similar to that of Merlin and Farber (1976), but they allow any
finite amount of time to return to normal execution. For many real-time
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systems, timing constraints are more strict than this. Thus doing nothing for a
certain amount of time can be as dangerous under certain conditions as perform
ing an incorrect action even though control is ultimately restored.
Definition: A string A is a subsequence of string B if and only if A can be
obtained from B by deleting zero or more elements of B.
Definition: A process P is fault-tolerant for a control failure tj E Tp if and
only if a) it is recoverable and b) a correct behavior path is a subsequence of
every path from the initial state to any terminal state. A correct behavior
path is a path in the FRG from the initial state to final state which contains
no failure transitions, i.e. a sequence of transitions tj...tj^ E T such that for
all i, t. ETp and t.) = a-, for i=l..n, is not firable
Note that for nonterminating or cyclic processes, may not be a terminal
state but may instead be the initial state.
Definition: A system is fail-safe if and only if all paths from a failure F in
the FRG contain only low-risk states.
i.e. for all states and sequences s^ such that 6 (<Tq,SjF) =
there does not exist a sequence Sg and state <Tp E high-risk states such that
Note that the system may never get back to a legal state.
The above definitions can be extended to include the possibility of n failures, thus
a system, for example, may be n-fault tolerant, n-l-l-recoverable, and n-|-2-fail-
safe.
Two analysis approaches are possible. The first is to determine, perhaps
through past experience, which failures are most likely, and then to create the
resulting Failure Reachability Graph (FRG) and analyze it for the above proper
ties. This may be very costly (and possibly impractical) for complex systems
with many possible failure modes. Also, in software it is difficult to determine
directly which failures are the most likely.
An alternative approach is to take the safety viewpoint and consider only
those failures with the most serious consequences. Since this is the requirement
of most safety certification programs, there is a practical application for this type
of analysis. In this approach, single-point failures and failure sequences which
can lead to high-risk states are determined through the analysis after which the
design can be augmented with fault-detection and recovery devices to minimize
the risk of a mishap. If risk cannot be lowered sufficiently through these devices
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(e.g. there is an unacceptable probability they will fail or there are uncontrollable
variables such as human error involved), it is also possible to add additional
safety devices to the design. For example, the designer may add hazard-detection
and risk-minimization mechanisms which attempt to ensure that if a hazardous
state is reached, the risk will be eliminated or minimized by fail-safe techniques
which change the state to a no-risk or lesser-risk state while at the same time
minimizing the exposure time of the hazard.
As an example of the process, consider the Petri-net model in the previous
examples. If interested in failures which could result in high-risk states (e.g. the
train is approaching, Pg, and the gate is up, P^j), a backward reachability graph
can be constructed (figure 6b). The high-risk state is not reachable from the reg
ular Petri net, but examination of the reachability graph in figure 6c shows that
three single failures (each by themselves) would allow the high-risk state to be
reached, i.e. a failure transition fg which takes a token from Pg and puts one in
Pg, a failure transition fg which does the same for P^g and Pj^^, and a failure
transition f^ which involves an erroneous generation of a token in PlO Failure
transition fg is a human failure where the train ignores the warning signal. Tran
sition fg is a gate failure which results in a premature gate raising. The last
failure, fg could be caused by a spurious signal from the controlling computer.
Normally, the designer would now include standard failure detection mechanisms
in the design along with recovery procedures.
Failure transition fg in figure 6a was chosen as the basis for the fault toler
ance mechanism shown in figure 7. This failure models a spurious output signal
from the computer. The number of tokens in P^^ represent the maximum
number of failures that can occur during analysis. The analysis performed here is
for at most one failure. Transitions and Kg are used for fault detection and
subsequent recovery. After a failure, the system can be in two possible situations
depending on the current state of the gate. If the gate is up then one response to
a spurious up signal is to ignore it (shown in transition, R2)- The enabling condi
tions are P^^ (gate up) and ^10 (signal from the computer).
The second possibility is the safety critical situation. In this case a train in
approaching, the gate is down, and the erroneous signal is given to raise the gate.
In order to detect the situation redundant information must be contained in the
system. The model has an internal "view of the world" contained in Pg and Py
which correspond directly to the actual conditions P^^ and Pj^g. Fault detection
is accomplished by checking to see if Py and Pii occur at the same time. If so,
there is a discrepancy between the real world and the internal state.
computer
Figure 6a. A Petri Net Graph with Failures
2^7^10
Figure 6b Figure 6c
Backwards Reachability Graph Reachability Graph for Figure 6a
computer
Figure 7. A Petri Net Graph with Failure Transition and Recovery
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Upon failure detection, there are several possible recoveries —depending on
which model is accepted as the true state of the system (i.e. is the computer state
wrong or is the gate really up when it should be down). The safest solution is to
assume the gate is up and lower it. This is the purpose of transition, R^. Figure
8 shows the reachability graph for this net. From the untimed reachability graph
we see that for the state labelled 4 (conditions ^2' ^7' ^9' ^11' and Pj^),
recovery is initiated when a failure has not occurred. Further investigation
reveals that there is a point in time when the computer state is legitimately
inconsistent with the actual world (after t^ has fired but before t^ fires). One
solution is to put a time constraint on such that the minimum time of R^ is
greater than the maximum time of t,^. This forces failure detection to wait until
a consistent state has been permitted.
In summary, analysis of the failure reachability graph with respect to the
definitions of fault tolerant, recoverable, and fail-safe design will aid the designer
in adding appropriate failure detection and recovery techniques to the system.
When interested solely in a safety analysis, backward procedures can be used to
determine which failures and faults are potentially the most costly and thus need
to be augmented with fault tolerance mechanisms and also to determine where
and how safety mechanisms should be used. This may be particularly useful for
the software components of the system since it is difficult to determine which
faults are most likely to occur and the potential number of failures to model may
be very large. Furthermore, it is possible to treat the software at various levels
of abstraction, e.g. only failures of the interfaces of the software and non-
software components may be considered or more detailed failures of of only those
particular modules which are determined to be critical may be modeled.
Conclusions
The use of Time Petri nets in design and analysis of safety-critical, real-time
systems has been described and the basic model extended to allow modeling
failures and faults. This allows the system to be analyzed for properties such as
fault-tolerance and safety, to determine which functions are most critical and
thus may need to be made fault-tolerant (assuming that it may be too costly to
ensure complete fault-tolerance), to determine conditions which require immedi
ate mitigating action to prevent accidents, to determine possible sequences of
failures which can lead to accidents, etc. Thus it is possible to establish impor
tant properties during the synthesis of the design instead of using guesswork and
costly a posteriori analysis (including formal analysis and testing).
State # Places
1 ^1 ^6^11 ''h
2 ^2 ^5 ^6 ^11 ^14
3 ^1 ^6^10^11
4 ^2 ^7^9 ^11 ^li
5 ^2 ^5^6^10^11
6 ^1 ^6^11
7 ^2 ''7^12''14 ^
8 ^2 ^7 ^9^10^11
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Figure 8. Reachability Graph for Figure 7
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Unfortunately, Petri nets can be difficult to analyze. For general Petri nets,
the reachability problem, though decidable, has been shown to be exponential
time- and space-hard. Although this is not a necessary property of Petri net
models (many important and real systems can be analyzed efficiently), it is a pos
sible result when very complex systems are modeled. Some techniques which are
useful even if the entire reachability graph is not completed have been presented
in this paper. It is also possible to use the failure-enhanced Time Petri net model
as the basis for a simulation in order to answer some of the same questions which
could have been answered by the failure reachability graph. Finally, many real
time systems require the computer software to be written and tested before the
hardware components have been completed. Since the time Petri net model is
executable, the hardware parts can be used as a test bed for the software
development process.
In this paper, only severity of hazards were considered and not the probabil
ity of the hazard occurring or of leading to a mishap. This is a pessimistic
approach (i.e. all hazards are considered to have equally high probabilities). We
are currently devising techniques to include probabilities in the analysis. This
will enable the designer to use a more sophisticated definition of risk and to
derive measurements for risk (and thus safety) from the model. This in turn can
provide the information required by the designer to make difficult tradeoff deci
sions, e.g. what if there are two possible recovery methods, one of which is more
likely to work but also has worse penalties in the event of failure (perhaps in
terms of taking so long to execute that no other alternatives or fail-safe pro
cedures are still feasible).
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